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I.

Introduction
Consider the following: A hiring manager is using a piece of software to review applicants

for an open senior manager position at the company. They have entered the job description and
qualifications into the software. The trainers of the software instructed the hiring manager to use
the “best match” sort feature to have the best candidates appear first on the list. When
implementing this software, the technology company used the hiring manger’s company’s past
hiring decisions to help the software, using Artificial Intelligence (AI), predict who the best
performers for a given job would be. The problem for any female or minority candidate is the AI
evaluates them in terms of matching the firm’s history of hiring mostly white-male senior
managers. In the end, the AI software presents the white-male candidates at the top of the “best
match” list, while pushing the qualified female and minority candidates onto a second or third
page.
This issue is an example of AI algorithmic bias affecting employment and hiring decisions.
Bias can affect the decisions of an AI through the human bias of its creators, either through biased
training data or biased programming and model selection.1 This is not just a problem in hiring
decision though as the impact of AI is felt in nearly all major sectors of the world economy, from
healthcare and finance to real-estate and retail.2 To combat this problem, the executive branch has
requested the vast network of Federal agencies to craft industry specific AI regulation while

1

See Tivadar Danka, Five Real Dangers of AI, TOWARDS DATA SCIENCE (Apr. 20, 2020)
https://towardsdatascience.com/5-real-dangers-of-ai-1f94b4f0151d (describing algorithmic bias in hiring
decisions when the AI learned from past human bias in hiring decisions).
2
Akash Takyar, AI Applications Across Major Industries, LEEWAYHERTZ, available at
https://www.leewayhertz.com/ai-applications-across-major-industries/.
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somehow not impairing the advancement of AI technology and research.3 As of April 2021, no
federal agency has enacted any AI regulations.4
The purpose of this paper is to first describe the history of AI, its successes, and its failures.
The discussion will turn to the fundamentals of regulatory design, outside the lens of artificial
intelligence. With that mutual understanding, the discussion will then turn to the executive
branch’s outlined principal goals for future AI regulation and some environmental factors. Any
new AI regulation will face a small mountain of challenges to surmount before the regulator can
put it into action. Of worry, the size and scope of the AI industry is increasing faster by the day,
and conventional enforcement measures seem ill equipped to take on this scale of a problem,
especially with AI algorithms being so difficult to read or understand.5
This paper argues that the only regulatory option that can handle all the executive branch’s
requirements and be scalable and nimble enough to manage the ever-changing AI industry is a
regulator-owned “Nanny” AI. This AI would enter firms’ systems to validate that both the training
data of other AI and the reasoning that AI employs to reach its decisions does not violate any
regulatory rules or show bias against certain demographics. This paper concludes by showing
measures the AI regulator should take ensure this regulator “Nanny” AI is subject to democratic
accountability.

3

Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Guidance for Regulation of Artificial
Intelligence Applications, M-21-06 (Nov. 17, 2020), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/11/M-21-06.pdf.
4
Andrew Burt, New AI Regulations are Coming. Is Your Organization Ready, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Apr. 30,
2021), https://hbr.org/2021/04/new-ai-regulations-are-coming-is-your-organization-ready.
5
Artificial Intelligence Market Size, Share & Trends Analysis Report, 2021 – 2028, GRAND VIEW RESEARCH
(Jan. 2021), https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/artificial-intelligence-ai-market.
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II.

The Unregulated Approach to AI
A. THE PROMISE OF AN AI FUTURE
As of the end of 2020, the applications for AI in consumer products seems to be

snowballing and analysts project the AI industry to continue to show over forty-percent compound
growth per year for the next eight-years.6 Healthcare, pharmaceutical research, retail, marketing,
finance, and intelligent process automation are some of the sectors that will see the fastest AI
investment growth in the next five years.7 Tracing the long tail of AI development back in time,
most agree that the 1950 Allen Turing paper, Computing Machine and Intelligence, sparked the
artificial intelligence movement when it discussed how to build intelligent machines and how to
test their intelligence.8 Turing suggested that if humans use available information and reason to
solve problems and make decisions, why can’t machines do the same thing?9
Five years after the release of this paper, the first AI program, Logic Theorist, was
produced, and it was designed to prove mathematical theorems.10 After a famous 1956 conference
initiated by John McCarthy and Marvin Minsky to showcase this program and the future of AI,
the next twenty-years of AI development was catalyzed.11 Soon, researchers realized that

6

Id.
Takyar, supra note 2.
8
Rockwell Anyoha, The History of Artificial Intelligence, HARV. UNIV.: SCIENCE IN THE NEWS (Aug. 27,
2017), https://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/history-artificial-intelligence/; see Rebecca Reynoso, A
Complete History of Artificial Intelligence (May 25, 2021), https://www.g2.com/articles/history-of-artificialintelligence.
9
Anyoha, supra note 8.
10
Logic Theorist – Complete History of the Logic Theorist Program, History Computer, https://historycomputer.com/inventions/logic-theorist-complete-history-of-the-logic-theorist-program/ (last visited Jun.
12, 2021).
11
Anyoha, supra note 8.
7
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additional AI developments were futile because of the lack of computer horsepower, and the
problem was only solved in the late 1990’s.12
Coming back to the current day, computer resources are now sufficient to accomplish most,
if not all, research goals.13 Most of the recent AI programs put out into the world have developed
more from an ocean of data rather than elaborate algorithm enhancements, so paths for
advancement are still open.14 The following are four of the most recognizable accomplishments:
1) self-driving cars; 2) autonomous investing; 3) automated pharmaceutical development; and 4)
automated HR decisions.15
B. THE FAILURES OF UNREGULATED AI
“Until people see robots going down the street killing people, they don’t know how to react
because it seems so ethereal.”16 The fact that the birth and life of AI remains hidden within
computers makes it impossible for the public to identify when an AI is harming them, whether due
to failures in design or poor monitoring while the AI learns behavior.17 Some issues with AI do in
fact rear there head for the public to see, such as when an autonomous vehicle gets into an accident
a reasonable person would likely avoid.18

12

Id.
Id.
14
Id.
15
Takyar, supra note 2.
16
Elon Musk, CEO, Tesla, Ahead of the Curve, Address at the 2017 National Governors Association Summer
Meeting (Jul. 17, 2017) (stating AI is a fundamental risk to the existence of human civilization).
17
Unregulated use of AI is Threat to Sustainable Development, OPEN ACCESS GOVERNMENT (Aug. 28, 2020),
https://www.openaccessgovernment.org/sustainable-development/93559/ (recalling fiasco when algorithms
were asked to make nuanced decisions about academic achievement, based on elements that would never be
considered in an exam).
18
Neal E. Boudette, Crashes Involving Tesla Autopilot and other Driver-Assistance Systems get new
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 29, 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/29/business/tesla-autopilotsafety.html (Tesla has acknowledged that Autopilot can have trouble recognizing stopped emergency
vehicles.)
13
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A more worrisome danger relates to the potential bias that could be ingrained in an AI from
either bias present in training data, institutional bias, or developer bias.19 With AI now capable of
creating realistic fake images, the AIs threaten news feeds with misinformation in a tactic known
as deep fake; swaying target audiences towards certain thoughts.20 With automated investing
promising better returns by competing on an even playfield with the algorithms of the largest firms,
investors face the possibility of an AI harming them financially by choosing a conflicting
investor’s interests over their own.21 The ultimate goal of new AI regulations should be to target
and limit the impact of AI decisions based on existing biases or bad intentions.
C. THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING AI
Before a regulator can start designing effective regulation for the AI industry, it must avoid
and surmount the plethora of challenges specific to this industry. The first feature of the AI industry
that makes it one of the most difficult to regulate is it’s an industry in only the loosest sense of the
word; the use of computers to make decisions ranges from automation technology to
conversational and recognition systems.22 When firms create AI designed for different tasks and
impacts, the threats they pose vary by application and the regulatory system must increase in
complexity to match.23 Aside from the issue of breadth, the depth of the industry, in terms of the

19

See Danka, supra note 1 (describing algorithmic bias in hiring decisions when the AI learned from past
human bias in hiring decisions).
20
Id.
21
Cf. E. Scott Brummel, Confronting Natural Conflicts of Interest and Artificial Intelligence, Journal of Law
and the Biosciences, Volume 4, Issue 2, August 2017, Pages 435–444, https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsx029
(highlighting the risk of AI avoiding a doctor’s COI and replacing it with an invisible COI created from
biased protocols and recommendations).
22
Ronald Schmelzer, The Complex Nature of Regulating AI, TECHTARGET (Dec. 27, 2019),
https://searchenterpriseai.techtarget.com/feature/The-complex-nature-of-regulating-AI.
23
Id.
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sheer quantity of AI systems and their rapid growth rate, pose a significant resource challenge for
the future regulator to first discover all of the AI systems and then monitor as many as they can.24
There exists a mainstream bias against regulation as always being inefficient and, if applied
to AI, regulation would run against the strategic goal for continued rapid development.25 Arguably,
the most talked about challenges of regulating AI are the transparency and explainability of AI.26
Transparency refers to the black-box nature of many public and some private organizations which
inhibits outsiders, including regulators, from observing operations.27 Explainability is the concept
of designing AI from the outset to that individuals other than the developer can understand how
and why the AI is reaching its decisions.28 The reason explainability is a challenge is that the best
and most efficient AIs are “deep learning” and by nature hard to explain, even for the creating
developer.29
III.

Review: An Abundance of Regulatory Design Options
The Federal legislative process has failed to enact meaningful AI-focused statutes that

would protect individual’s privacy and curtail the discriminatory impact AIs have already
demonstrated. In 2019, congress introduced two draft bills, one in the house, the other in the
senate.30 US Senators Cory Booker (D-NJ) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) along with Rep. Yvette D.
Clarke (D-NY) introduced the Algorithmic Accountability Act in April 2019 in the house of

24

Id.; Artificial Intelligence Market Size, supra note 5.
Jia Kai, AI Regulation: Understanding the Real Challenges, Paris Innovation Review (May 25, 2017),
http://parisinnovationreview.com/articles-en/ai-regulation-understanding-the-real-challenges.
26
Charles Morgan, Responsible AI: A Global Policy Framework, ITechLaw 1, 113-14 (2018) (explaining
the obligation of transparency and explainability).
27
Id.; see Schmelzer, supra note 22.
28
Morgan, supra note 26.
29
Id.
30
Cynthia Brumfield, New AI Privacy, Security Regulations likely coming with Pending Federal, State Bills,
CSO (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3600238/new-ai-privacy-security-regulationslikely-coming-with-pending-federal-state-bills.html.
25
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representatives. That bill required companies to find and fix flawed algorithms that result in
inaccurate, unfair, biased, or discriminatory decisions impacting Americans.31 It also required
entities to conduct automated decision system impact assessments and data protection impact
assessments.32
The Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act was the other aforementioned AI related
bill introduced in 2019.33 That bill, introduced to the Senate, prohibited entities from “collecting,
processing, storing, or controlling facial recognition data unless such entities (1) provide
documentation that explains the capabilities and limitations of facial-recognition technology, and
(2) obtain explicit affirmative consent from end-users to use such technology after providing notice
about the reasonably foreseeable uses of the collected facial-recognition data.”34 The bill was
concerned with facial-recognition data that enables an AI to uniquely and consistently identify a
specific individual.35 While, if enacted into law, these bills resemble positive steps forward on the
path to protecting individuals from bad behaving Ais, the Federal legislative process has thus far
failed because both bills have died in their respective committees.36
Seeing the present and potential future issues with an unregulated AI industry, the
executive branch made it clear their desire to reign in the risks associated with rapid AI
development. On February 11th, 2019, President Donald J. Trump issued an executive order
directing the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and others, to draft a memorandum to

31

Id.
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
See H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (2019), S. 847, 116th Cong. (2019).
32
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outline how the numerous Federal Agencies should begin regulating AI.37 The OMB responded to
this order by, on November 17th, 2020, issuing a memorandum that outlines the principles for
future regulation while keeping the executive branch’s concern of not slowing down the
development of AI at the forefront.38
In this memorandum, the OMB outlined the following ten principles all Federal Agencies
should follow when formulating regulatory and non-regulatory approaches to the design,
development, deployment, and operation of AI applications: 1) Public Trust of AI; 2) Public
Participation; 3) Scientific Integrity and Information Quality; 4) Risk Assessment and
Management; 5) Benefits and Costs; 6) Flexibility; 7) Fairness and Non-Discrimination; 8)
Disclosure and Transparency; 9) Safety and Security; and 10) Interagency Coordination.39 If
regulations would be too burdensome for either the agency or the regulated entities, the agency
should allow the industries to establish voluntary consensus standards.40 The primary benefit of
voluntary consensus standards is that they allow the requisite adaptability to keep pace with the
rapid AI development curve.41
With this memorandum from the OMB, the executive branch has identified its principal
goals for the future of AI and mandated that all Federal agencies develop new regulatory
machinations to minimize the risks facing the public while still promoting rapid growth in the
field. The Federal Register lists that there are currently 241 Federal agencies and another 215 sub-

37

Exec. Order No. 13859, Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967
(Feb. 11, 2019), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-maintainingamerican-leadership-artificial-intelligence/.
38
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, supra note 3.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
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agencies.42 Absent extensive cross-agency cooperation, all these 456 Federal bodies will have to
individually consider how to both design and enforce AI regulations. This process of regulation is
still in the infancy stage as initial plans of regulation, a two-page form, was due from each agency
to the OMB by May 17, 2021.43
Since the release of the OMB’s memorandum, a new presidential administration has started
under the leadership of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.44 Whether this new administration continues
the previous administration’s agency, and often industry, specific regulation strategy or works with
Congress to create a new agency aimed at regulating AI across all industries is unknown.
Regardless of the top-level structure, these new regulations will need to follow tried and true
regulatory design methodology, namely regulatory form, function, and scope, and apply them to
this burgeoning industry.
A. REGULATORY FORMS – MEANS V. ENDS, MICRO V. MACRO
While not the only way of conceptualizing regulatory design, breaking it into the two
attributes, means versus ends and micro versus macro, harmonizes the linguistics and follows
scholarly literature on regulation.45 “Means-based” regulation focuses on actions, such as the use
of a technology or practice.46 For example, regulators may require firms to install a particular type
of valve, retain certain documents, conduct certain observations or measurements, or inspect the
condition of equipment at specified intervals.47 Alternatively, an “Ends-based” regulation can

42

Agencies, Federal Register (Apr. 16, 2021), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies.
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, supra note 3.
44
Inaugural Address by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., The White House (Jan. 20, 2021) available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/01/20/inaugural-address-by-presidentjoseph-r-biden-jr/.
45
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018, Designing Safety Regulations for High
Hazard Industries, The National Academies Press, (2018), available at https://doi.org/10.17226/24907.
46
Id.
47
Id.
43
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mandate the achievement or avoidance of certain ends. “Ends-based” regulation may require that
a code-compliant building be capable of evacuating all occupants in a designated time, that a
factory keep its emission of air pollutants below certain levels, or that an employer keep the
workplace free of all identifiable hazards.
“Micro-level” regulations target a specific contributor or underlying pathway to the
ultimate problem.48 “Macro-level” regulations, on the other hand, broaden their focus to the
ultimate problem itself.49 Regulators choose micro-level far more often than macro-level because
they are more precise, and regulators can bundled them together to tackle complex problems or
situations.50 As an example, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has
issues hundreds of micro-level safety standards such as automobile exterior lighting, braking, and
occupant protection.51 The NHTSA chose this micro-level approach because of the layered web of
factors that lead to the ultimate problem; traffic fatalities and injuries.52 However, for the ultimate
problem of motor vehicle fuel economy, the NHTSA has chosen macro-level regulations requiring
an average fleetwide fuel level for each automaker.53 The NHTSA decided the micromanagement
of the factors leading to fuel efficiency was not necessary, and the automakers appreciate the
flexibility this macro-level regulation provides them.54
Following the definitions of these two attributes of regulatory design, one can describe
current regulations and limits in one of four categories: 1) Micro-means; 2) Micro-ends; 3) Macro-

48

Id.
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
49
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means; and 4) Macro-ends. It is with these categories that the future AI regulators should refine
their approach while keeping in mind the goals outlined by the executive branch’s OMB.

TABLE 1 Four Types of Regulations with Examples
Means

End

Micro

Micro-Means
Micro-Ends
x Install a hazard warning sign
x Ensure
that
an
electrical
having a certain color scheme
component of a product passes a
test for shock resistance
x Install a particular type of valve
x
Limit sulfur dioxide emissions to
x Inspect
the
condition
of
certain levels
equipment at a defined time
interval
x Demonstrate the capability to
evacuate all occupants from a
x Construct a pipeline by using a
building in a designated time
specified grade of steel

Macro

Macro-Means
Macro-Ends
x Engage in threat and risk analysis
x Keep the workplace free from
recognized hazards
x Establish and execute a safety
x Design and maintain a facility to
management program
prevent releases of hazardous
x Reevaluate and revise safety
substances
management plan at regular
x Avoid a transportation accident55
intervals

55

Id.
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Means
Micro

Ends

Micro-Means

Macro

First, micro-means (prescriptive) regulations offer clear instructions about actions that
regulated entities must take, and they also allow the regulator or other approved third party to
easily monitor these actions.56 The disadvantages of micro-means regulations are that it is furthest
away from the Government’s ultimate concerns, and it is inflexible and not best suited for rapidly
changing regulatory environments.57
Means
Micro

Ends
Micro-Ends

Macro

Second, micro-ends (performance-based) regulations require regulated entities to meet
some measurable goal or not exceed some listed limit, such as and EPA limit on air pollutants or
the earlier mentioned fuel efficiency regulation of the NHTSA.58 Compared to micro-means, this

56
See Id.; Wendell Pritchett, Types of Regulation, The Regulatory Review (Apr. 5, 2016), available at
https://www.theregreview.org/2016/04/05/pritchett-types-of-regulation/.
57
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018, supra note 45.
58
Id.
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form of regulatory design has greater flexibility for regulated entities to remain in compliance and
the regulations are more directly linked to the ultimate concern of the Government.59 Advocates
of this regulatory design category argue that it promotes innovation and reduces costs by
encouraging the regulated entity to figure out the best way to achieve societal goals.60 The primary
issue with micro-ends regulation is that measurement of the required ends can be difficult and
prohibitively costly for both the regulated entities and regulators.61 This difficulty in monitoring
can lead to bad actors gaming the system, such as the Volkswagen scandal when the company
rigged its emission system to skirt regulatory limits.62
Means

Ends

Micro

Macro

Macro-Means

The third regulatory design category is macro-means (management-based) regulations
which infuse a greater level of responsibility and accountability into the regulated entities. 63 A
typical regulation of this category requires a regulated entity to develop risk management plan, but
the regulation does not usually specify exactly what such a plan must contain.64 While, compared
to micro-means, these plans offer greater flexibility, there is risk here that, if the regulator lacks

59

Id.
Pritchett, supra note 56.
61
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018, supra note 45.
62
Pritchett, supra note 56.
63
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018, supra note 45.
64
Id.
60
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the expertise to effectively review these management plans and their execution, bad acting firms
may slip through the regulatory gaps.65 To mitigate this issue, regulators impose a collection of
macro-level regulations that can work in unison to ensure overall firm compliance. 66 There are
risks with this approach though, as, one, too many regulations on an industry can prove overly
costly to both the firms and public resources, and, two, the more regulations, the less likely they
all are complementary to each other.67
Another issue with macro-means regulations is that if the regulated industry consists of
firms of varying sizes, the smaller firms may not be able to bear the burden of establishing and
executing complex risk management plans, thus stifling growth.68 In limited circumstances,
agencies have chosen to use a management-based regulator technique known as “potential
regulation” which place no initial restrictions on a firm’s activities, but, if the firm’s performance
is judged to be unsatisfactory according to the regulator, such as customer complaints, restrictions
will them be installed.69 In the case of “potential regulation”, the monitors of the firm’s activities
are its customer, and if these monitors can be satisfied, the firm can avoid direct regulatory
scrutiny.70

65

Id.
Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Designing Smart Regulation, OECD, available at
https://www.oecd.org/environment/outreach/33947759.pdf.
67
Id.
68
See Id.; Pritchett, supra note 56.
69
David Sappington, Principles of Regulatory Policy Design, The World Bank (Jan. 1994).
70
Id.
66
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Means

Ends

Micro

Macro

Macro-Ends

The fourth, and final, regulatory design category, macro-ends, is also the least category of
consequence with regards to regulating the AI industry. This category limits regulated entities via
tort liability or “general duty” provisions.71 While these liabilities are closely tied to the ultimate
concern, the public can be concerned with the ex-post liability not being effective at incentivizing
firms to meet the ends.72 Firms may find that the cost of insurance or benefits of misconduct are
more attractive than limiting their exposure to tort liability.73 In certain, appropriate, industries, a
form of macro-ends design, known as “incentive regulation”, grants the firm freedom of decision
and the Government rewards firms based on how they perform according with set goals or
benchmarks.74 For the telecom industry, the Government sets a price cap which details what the
average price of services should be, but the firm has complete control over how they price their
services and the government rewards them if they come in below the target.75
Outside of these four categories of regulatory design, regulators still have more options to
choose from, usually doing so in more nuanced situations. In the case of the FDA, the regulator
allows pharmaceutical development to begin free of restrictions, but unless the FDA approves of

71

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018, supra note 45.
Id.
73
Id.
74
Sappington, supra note 69.
75
Id.
72
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the drug, drug companies cannot sell it to the public.76 This form of regulation is known as
“reactive” policy.77 Proactive policies, in contrast, place restrictions on firms from the outset, such
as the FDA barring research into human cloning.78 Sound regulatory design, especially with
regards to AI regulation, requires regulators to implement a collection of restrictions; micro-level
when Federal expertise and budget allows; macro-level when flexibility is key and the regulated
firms have exhibited good behavior.
B. REGULATORY FUNCTION: INFORMING V. ENFORCING
Function is a second dimension by which regulation policies can differ from one another.
Regulators, seeking to protect the public from commercial wrongdoing, must deploy the protective
regulations through either informing or enforcing functioning regulations.79 A primary example of
informing

regulation

is

the

requirement

that

food

manufacturers

list

all

the

ingredients contained in their products.80 In comparison, enforcing regulation in the food industry
could prohibit the use of certain chemicals in foods.81 A second example of
the difference between informing and enforcing regulations can be taken from the textile
manufacturing industry. Informing regulation might require each manufacturer of machinery to
cover the dangerous parts of a machine with visible warning stickers to warn end-users of said
dangers.82

76

Enforcing

regulation,

in

contrast,

might

impose

industry-

Id.
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), (2016). Textile machinery — Safety requirements
(ISO Standard No. 11111-1), available at https://www.iso.org/standard/65561.html.
77
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wide safety standards, requiring all manufacturers to surround the machines in transparent doors
which are impossible to open while the machine is in operation.83
The key distinction between informing and enforcing regulation is the discretion afforded
the protected population.84 Informing regulation enables the population to make well-informed
choices; enforcing regulation makes choices for the population.85 The choice of regulatory function
is tied to both the ultimate goal of the regulation and the relative costs of acquiring and processing
information for the regulator and for the protected population.86 If the regulator shows weakness
when enforcing existing regulations, they may be limited to employing only informing regulation
since firms will be unlikely to take the regulator’s threats or promises seriously.87 In such a
scenario, a bad acting and regulated firm can only be disciplined by informed consumers (and
possibly competitors).88 AI regulations are capable of functioning by informing and enforcing
regulations, but the regulator must be committed to disciplining those firms that violate enforcing
regulations so that the regulated industry does not lose faith in the regulator.89 However, AI
informing regulations are unlikely to be effective unless the regulator presents the information to
consumers as close to the interaction with the AI as possible so that the consumer does not lose
the information in a sea of distracting information online. On the other hand, analysts project the
scale of the AI industry to grow annually by over forty percent which will make the regulator’s
task of enforcing regulations time intensive and exhausting.90

83

Id.
Sappington, supra note 69.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Artificial Intelligence Market Size, supra note 5.
84
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C. SCOPE OF REGULATION
The third and final dimension of regulations is the scope or breadth of the regulation, and
the comprehensiveness of a given regulation is nearly always controlled by the type of industry it
targets.91 In some industries, like telecommunications, comprehensive regulation is common.92
The regulator generally controls the prices charged by the telecommunications provider, limits the
firm's earnings, monitors the quality of the firm’s products, oversees the firm's major investments,
and dictates the markets in which the firm is allowed to operate.93 In other industries, like
pharmaceuticals, regulation is often more partial. The FDA regulates the safety of drugs, but they
neither regulate drug prices nor the earnings of pharmaceutical companies.94 Another factor on the
scope of regulation is the number of suppliers of a similar product that have varying firm sizes.95
The larger firms draw more regulator attention and become subject to a suite of enforcing
regulations whereas the regulator may completely ignore a smaller firm.96 To correlate this with
the AI industry, the tech giants (Google, Facebook, Amazon, Apple, etc.) will likely draw intense
attention from the regulator, while the rest of the commercial market that creates and employs AI
is likely to be subject to a more manageable set of enforcement regulations.
The three dimensions of regulatory design—form, function, and scope—are interwoven
and similarly impacted by five key factors of the regulatory environment: 1) regulator goals; 2)
regulator resources; 3) regulator reputation and commitment to enforcement; 4) the nature of the

91

Sappington, supra note 69.
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
92
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regulated product and its customers; and 5) scale, complexity, and access to information.97 A
regulator would be wise to study these environmental factors towards the beginning of the
regulatory design process so that the proposed regulation is more likely to fit its target industry.
With that step complete, the regulator can move the levers of the regulatory design machine to find
the appropriate balance point for each of the three design dimensions and proceed towards
enactment.
IV.

Draft Regulatory Framework for the AI Industry; Employ “Nanny” AI to Inspect
Regulated AI

A. ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING AI
i. THE VARIED APPLICATIONS OF AI REQUIRE A COMPLEX REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Varied industries find use of AI in their businesses by seeing AI’s potential to solve
problems unique to their sector, ranging from automated decision-making based on “big data”, to
autonomous fleets of vehicles, and to reducing expensive employee headcount.98 The Federal
government issued a memo outlining their plan to tackle this scope issue; the regulations should
be agency and industry specific.99 In that same memo, the government admitted the lack of AI
expertise within the government and instructed the agencies to seek guidance in crafting the
regulations from the regulated industries themselves.100 However, political capture is a significant
issue in situations with such a divide in expertise between the government and the regulated, or
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when some firms have outlandish lobbying budgets.101 In the financial crisis of 2007, the financial
industry used political capture to weaken enforcement results and fines, and the public saw firms
getting off easy for their wrongdoings.102 The fact remains that the government lacks the expertise
to design regulations for AI while being insulated from industry influence.103 Therefore, the early
stages of AI regulation must be guided by the industry.104
To mitigate future risks of political capture, the regulator should consider the OECD’s four
strategies: 1) using decision-making processes that promote inclusiveness and social
accountability; 2) fostering transparency and access to information; 3) enabling the external
accountability of decision-makers through supreme audit institutions and regulatory enforcement
agencies; and 4) addressing capture risks through integrity measures at the organizational level.105
Taking this advice, the AI regulator should engage a multitude of viewpoints from industry, make
the project open to outside observers, and have a cooperation agreement established that sets out
audit and integrity standards. The government should also be aggressive at hiring away industry
professionals and recent graduates without deep ties to industry to reduce the expertise gap.
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ii. THE GROWTH OF THE AI INDUSTRY REQUIRES LARGE AND FLEXIBLE REGULATOR
RESOURCES
Because analysts anticipate the AI industry to have accelerating growth over the next eight
years, the regulator must devise a regulatory framework that meets the primary goals of the
government while also being scalable.106 If the regulator chose micro-means regulations, such
inspecting training datasets to ensure compliance with bias standards, that would put a lot of strain
on regulator resources to conduct meaningful inspections and would be difficult to scale up as the
industry grows.107 These regulations are also the least flexible and would make application to a
variety of industry application of AI troublesome.108
Micro-ends regulation, such as limiting the types of decisions and applications AI can be
used for, offers the flexibility needed, but sacrifices the ability for non-experts to measure
compliance easily.109 The black-box nature of some AI also mutes the impact of these regulations
since all but the last output of the system are hidden and a firm could use that feature to hide bad
acts.110 Without in-house expertise, macro-means regulations, such as requirements for risk
management plan submission to the regulator, seems non-workable because the plans would be
too complicated for a non-expert to conduct a meaningful review and audit.111 These plans would
also hurt the growth of smaller AI development firms due to their high cost of implementation
with no return of revenue.112
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With no clear best option, a mixture of these types of regulations is the approach a regulator
should take for AI, but micro-means inspections are the only way to protect against algorithmic
bias and AI designed for harmful purposes, each principal goals for the government.113 In order to
mitigate the intense resource issue with micro-means regulations, the regulator should consider
using AI technology to automate the inspection process of external AIs. From here on, this
discussion will refer to this regulator AI as the “Nanny” AI.
iii. THE REGULATOR MUST SHOW THE REGULATIONS WILL NOT STIFLE AI DEVELOPMENT
The proposed “Nanny” AI must demonstrate to Congress and the regulatory community
that it is not another inefficient regulation that would slow the growth of the AI industry.114 The
OMB draft rules required any agency rule to show that the intended benefits of the AI regulation
outweigh the costs, particularly on the industry.115 A common inefficiency of regulation presents
itself when poorly written rules incentivize firms to make undesirable choices, such as when
Japanese car manufacturers designed cars to be heavier than needed to become subject to less strict
efficiency standards.116 Another example is the risk management plan development costs discussed
for macro-means regulations.117 The largest efficiency concern the government expressed for AI
regulation is that AI development should not be slowed or hindered by any new regulation, industry
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growth is paramount.118 The AI regulator must show how the “Nanny” AI supports the principal
goals of the government, detail how it will interface and interact with private and public firms, and
ensure that it will have minimal negative impact on the AI developers’ research or the firms’
profits.
iv. THE REGULATIONS MUST ENCOURAGE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC FIRM TRANSPARENCY AND
AI EXPLAINABILITY
Congress must give the AI regulator enough congressional authority that its enforcement
capabilities are able to control previously inaccessible, black-box firms, regardless of their public
or private status. This level of transparency equates to access to firm data and communications
with AI developers to understand their intentions for the firm’s AI(s).119 Firms will push back on
this level of access, claiming that the AI algorithms and related training data are trade secrets.120
The firms will also complain that compelling a business or agency to publicize decision-making
rules, such as a method for determining when an individual should be audited, may allow potential
auditees to game the system.121 To assuage the firms’ fears, the regulator could create rules that
define what can and cannot be disclosed from firm data and technology. The regulator should be
most interested in issuing cease and desist orders to a firm if an AI is causing harm and publishing
notices of violation when the regulator discovers bias in an AI’s training data, or the AI is making
biased decisions. The regulator’s goal is not to disclose firm IP.
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The goal of AI explainability is to take an AI model’s outputs and be able to accurately
describe how it got to those outputs.122 Explainability is an important concern for regulators
because as AIs continue to get more advanced, they will increasingly become opaquer, particularly
in data-driven technologies like machine learning where the relation between input
and output is harder to explain.123 The risk of hidden features and decisions within an black-box
AI is just the fear that ignited the executive branch’s request for regulation.124 Explainability
receives significant criticism from industry, however, as they argue that the most powerful AI
models are those that are hardest to explain; the chief advantage of AI is it can solve problems that
humans never could.125 The goal for the “Nanny” AI would be to allow firms to develop the AI
models as sophisticated as they want so long as, with sufficient access to data, the regulator’s AI
will be able to describe how the firm’s AI came to its decisions.
B. ENSURING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY OVER THE “NANNY” AI
There is no guarantee that the “Nanny” AI, government funded and built, will be any better
at avoiding bias or making the right decisions for enforcement actions one-hundred out of onehundred times. If the regulator’s AI shows it to be faulty or inaccurate, the regulator’s enforcement
powers will weaken considerably.126 One benefit of a new regulator relying on industry to help
craft rules, and potentially a regulatory AI, is that it democratizes the process and lets the sun shine
light on the decisions made.127 However, in a recent executive order made by the then outgoing
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President Trump, the President proclaimed that any significant agency rule approved by anyone
other than a politically appointed staff member should be assumed to be lacking democratic
accountability.128
Like the regulated firm’s concern that if their AI is too transparent it would allow outsiders
to game the system, the regulator would be concerned that if the “Nanny” AI’s methodology was
widely known, regulated entities could tailor their AI to hide from the regulator.129 Therefore, the
regulator would desire to keep secret certain aspects of the “Nanny” AI, thus diminishing
democratic accountability to an extent.130 To improve this situation, the regulator should make
routine stress testing results of the AI public, showing that the AI correctly flagged or didn’t flag
suspect AIs and training data for enforcement actions. Since all Federal agencies originate from
some Congressional authorization, Congress has the power to have an oversight committee
perform random inspections of the “Nanny” AI’s results.131 The last major role for this outside
oversight committee would be to vet the backgrounds of any developer creating or modifying the
regulator’s AI with their goal being to prevent a developer’s bias from infecting the training data
or making the system more inaccurate.132 By using private industry to help craft the rules and AI,
being as transparent as possible with inspection and testing results, and being subject to
congressional oversight, the AI regulator is sufficiently ensuring democratic accountability over
their enforcement powers.
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V.

Conclusion
The wild west that is AI development has sufficiently shown itself to cause direct harm to

individuals, especially from bias inherited from the AI developers, training data, and historic bias.
The executive branch has already identified ten principals for future regulation of AI, notably
public trust, and transparency, but we are still waiting for either the legislative branch to pass laws
or Federal agencies to even propose rules for regulating the industry.133
To effectively control the AI industry without imposing burdens on the industries growth
rate, the regulator must navigate the following four challenges: 1) the variety of AI applications
forcing regulatory complexity; 2) the size and growth of the industry requiring large and flexible
regulatory resources; 3) the regulations not stifling industry growth; a demand of the executive
branch; and 4) the regulations coercing private and public firms to be more transparent and
incentivizing their AIs to be explainable.134 For the regulator to both meet the executive branch’s
goals for regulation and overcome the four critical challenges, the regulator must employ micromeans inspection regulations and utilize AI technology to make the magnitude of the regulatory
task feasible.
For the public to trust the regulator’s “Nanny” AI and the regulator’s related enforcement
actions to be effective, the AI system must demonstrate its accuracy, and, for the latter, the
regulator must be committed to even-handed enforcement.135 As the industry evolves, so too will
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the “Nanny” AI, and it will be imperative for an oversight committee to routinely review the AI’s
performance results so that democratic accountability is protected.136
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